"Change," Chandler et al. (1974, 108) noted four decades ago, "is both methodologically and substantively critical for any theory of policy." This is true of both of the determinants of government policies, such as shifts in public mood or changes in the eligible electorate (e.g., Stimson , MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Husted and Kenny 1997), and of policy feedback on political and social outcomes (e.g., Wlezien 1995; Campbell 2012) . Theories of all these phenomena rely explicitly or implicitly on models of policy change. Moreover, many of the most ambitious theories focus not on individual policies or policy domains, but on the character of government policy as a whole. In short, most theories of policymaking are both dynamic and holistic: they are concerned with changes in the general orientation of government policy.
Unfortunately, the literature on U.S. state politics, perhaps the most vibrant field for testing theories of policymaking, relies almost exclusively on policy indicators that are either measured at a single point in time (e.g., Wright, Erikson, and McIver 1987) or else cover only a partial subset of state policy outputs (e.g., Besley and Case 2003) . proxies for what is often the outcome of interest, the overall orientation of state policy.
In this paper, we develop a holistic yearly summary of the ideological orientation of state policies, which we refer to as state policy liberalism. This measure is based on a unique dataset of 148 policies, which covers nearly eight decades and includes policy domains ranging from labor regulation and civil rights to gun control and gay rights. 2 Based on these data, we estimate policy liberalism in each year using a dynamic Bayesian latent-1. To our knowledge, the only existing holistic yearly summary of state policies is Jacoby and Schneider's (2009) measure of particularistic versus collective state spending priorities between 1982 and 2005. As we discuss below, our measures di↵er substantially in time coverage, conceptual interpretation, and the data used to construct them.
2. Both the policy data and our policy liberalism estimates will be made available to the public upon publication of this article.
liberalism. We then provide evidence for the validity of our measure. We show that it is highly correlated with existing measures of policy liberalism and related concepts, and that a one-dimensional scale adequately accounts for systematic policy variation across states. The penultimate section discusses potential applications of our measure, illustrating its usefulness with an analysis of the policy e↵ects of voter registration laws. The final section concludes.
Measuring State Policies
Studies of state policy generally employ one of two measurement strategies: they either consider policy separately using policy-specific indicators, or they construct composite measures intended to summarize the general orientation of state policies within or across domains (Jacoby and Schneider 2014, 568) . Among studies in the first camp, some have focused on whether or not states have particular policies. Lax What is policy liberalism? We conceptualize liberalism not as a logically coherent ideology, but as a set of ideas and issue positions that, in the context of American politics, "go together" (Converse 1964 ). Relative to conservatism, liberalism involves greater government regulation and welfare provision to promote equality and protect collective goods, and less government e↵ort to uphold traditional morality and social order at the expense of personal autonomy. Conversely, conservatism places greater emphasis on the values of economic free-dom and cultural traditionalism (e.g., Ellis and Stimson 2012, 3-6) . Although the definitions of liberalism and conservatism have evolved over time, with civil rights and then social issues becoming more salient relative to economics (Ladd 1976, 589-93) , these ideological cleavages have existed in identifiable form since at least the mid-20th century (Schickler 2013; Noel 2014 
Policy Data
As Jacoby and Schneider (2014) observe, composite measures of policy liberalism risk tautology if they are derived from policy indicators selected for their ideological character.
Although the resulting scale may be a valid measure of policy liberalism, selection bias in the component indicators undermines any claim that state policies vary along a single dimension. For this reason, we sought to make our dataset of state policies as comprehensive as possible, so as to allow ideological structure to emerge from the data rather than imposing it a priori. Given resource constraints and data limitations, we cannot claim to have constructed a random sample of the universe of state policies (if such a thing is even possible).
We are confident, however, that our dataset of 148 distinct policies is broadly representative of the policy outputs of states across a wide range of domains. (For complete details on the policies in our dataset, see the online appendix accompanying this article.)
To be included in our dataset, a policy had to meet the following criteria. First, it had to be a policy output rather than a policy outcome (i.e., an aspect of the social environment a↵ected by policy) or a government institution (i.e., one of the basic structures or rules of the government). For example, we excluded state incarceration and infant-mortality rates, which we considered outcomes. We also excluded indicators for whether states had particular legislative rules or government agencies, which we classified as institutions. 6 Second, the policy had to be politically salient. To identify salient policies, we canvassed books and articles on state politics, legal surveys of state policies, state party platforms, governors'
biographies, state-specific political histories, and government and interest-group websites.
6. The dataset used in this paper excludes electoral policies as well. We do this for the pragmatic reason that scholars may want to use our measure to examine the e↵ect of such policies.
Third, the policies had to be comparable across all states. Many environmental, parks, and farm policies, for example, are not comparable across states due to fundamental di↵erences in state geography (e.g., coastal versus non-coastal). Some policies we normalized by an appropriate baseline to make them more comparable. 7 Finally, in keeping with our focus on dynamics, data on a given policy had to be available in comparable form in at least five di↵erent years.
The actual policy data themselves were obtained from many di↵erent sources, including government documents, the Book of the States, interest-group publications, and various secondary sources. 8 Over four-fifths of the policies are ordinal (primarily dichotomous), but the 26 continuous variables provide disproportionate information because they di↵erentiate more finely between states. 9 The policy domains covered by the dataset include
• abortion (e.g., parental notification requirements for minors)
• criminal justice (e.g., the death penalty)
• drugs and alcohol (e.g., marijuana decriminalization)
• education (e.g., per-pupil education spending; ban on corporal punishment)
• the environment (e.g., protections for endangered species)
• civil rights (e.g., fair employment laws; gay marriage)
• gun control (e.g., handgun registration)
• labor (e.g., right-to-work laws)
• social welfare (e.g., AFDC/TANF benefits)
• taxation (e.g., income tax rates) and miscellaneous other regulations, such as fireworks bans and bicycle helmet laws.
To validate the comprehensiveness of our dataset, we can compare its coverage to other datasets that were constructed for di↵erent purposes. For example, our policies cover 17
7. We adjusted all monetary expenditure and welfare benefit policies into 2012 dollars. We also adjusted for cost-of-living di↵erences between states (Berry, Fording, and Hanson 2000).
8. In general, we tried to obtain primary sources for each policy indicator. When this proved impossible, we obtained multiple secondary sources to corroborate the information about each policy in our database.
9. We standardized each continuous policy to ensure that the scales were comparable across policy areas. 
Measurement Model
We use the policy dataset described above to construct yearly measures of state policy liberalism. Like most previous work on the subject, we treat policy liberalism as a latent variable whose values can be inferred from observed policy indicators. Our latent-variable model (LVM), however, o↵ers several improvements over previous measurement strategies, most of which have relied on factor analysis applied to cross-sectional data. First, we use a Bayesian LVM, which unlike classical factor analysis provides straightforward means of characterizing the uncertainty of the latent scores and also easily handles missing data by imputing estimates on the fly (Jackman 2009, 237-8 
where N J indicates a J-dimensional multivariate normal distribution and is a J ⇥ J covariance matrix. In this application, we assume to be diagonal, but this assumption could be relaxed to allow for correlated measurement error across variables. Note that ↵ jt , which is analogous to the "di culty" parameter in the language of item-response theory, varies by year t, whereas the "discrimination" j is assumed to be constant across time.
We accommodate data of mixed type via the function linking latent and observed variables. If policy j is continuous, we assume y ⇤ jst is directly observed (i.e., y jst = y ⇤ jst ), just as in the conventional factor analysis model. If policy j is ordinal, we treat the observed y jst as a coarsened realization of y ⇤ jst whose distribution across K j > 1 ordered categories is determined by a set of K j + 1 thresholds ⌧ j = (⌧ j0 , . . . , ⌧ jk , . . . , ⌧ j,K j ). Following convention, we define ⌧ j0 ⌘ 1, ⌧ j1 ⌘ 0, and ⌧ jK j ⌘ 1, and we set the diagonal elements of that correspond to ordinal variables equal to 1. As in a ordered probit model, y jst falls into category k if and only if ⌧ j,k 1 < y ⇤ jst  ⌧ jk . Thus for ordinal variable j, the conditional probability that y
where is the standard normal CDF (Fahrmeir and Raach 2007, 329) . In the dichotomous case, where there are K j = 2 categories ("0" and "1"), the conditional probability that y jst falls in the second category (i.e., "1") is
which is identical to the conventional probit item-response model (Quinn 2004, 341 ).
We allow the ↵ jt to vary by year to account for the fact that many policies (e.g., seg- . In this application we use a local-level DLM, which models ↵ jt using a "random walk" prior centered on ↵ j,t 1 :
If there is no new data for an item in period t, then the transition model in Equation 4 
Estimates of State Policy Liberalism
Estimating our measurement model using the policy data described earlier produces a measure of the policy liberalism of each state in each year 1936-2014. When interpreting these estimates, one should bear in mind that the model allows the di culty parameters ↵ t to evolve over time. As a result, aggregate ideological shifts common to all states will be partially assigned to the policy di culties. Since states did adopt increasingly liberal policies over this period, the model partially attributes this trend to the increasing di culty of conservative policies (and increasing "easiness" of liberal ones). If we modify the model so as to hold the item di culties constant over time, the policies of all U.S. states are estimated to 12. Specifically, we constrain continuous measures of state spending to have a positive discrimination parameter, which implies that more liberal states spend more money. We also constrain the polarity of four dichotomous items. The discrimination of ERA ratification and prevailing wage laws are constrained to be positive, while the discrimination of right to work laws and bans on interracial marriage are constrained to be negative.
13. Note that we started the model in 1935 (t = 0) and discarded the first year of estimates. As a result, the informed priors on ✓ for four states in year t = 0 have little e↵ect on the estimates of state policy liberalism that we report in our analysis. We assign a N(1, 0.2 2 ) prior on ✓ s0 to New York and Massachusetts, and a N( 1, 0.2 2 ) prior for Georgia and South Carolina. Other states are given di↵use priors for ✓ st . 14. Stan is a C++ library that implements the No-U-Turn sampler (Ho↵man and Gelman, Forthcoming), a variant of Hamiltonian Monte Carlo that estimates complicated hierarchical Bayesian models more e ciently than alternatives such as BUGS. Pacific, and Great Lakes regions. New York, for example, has consistently had the most liberal tax and welfare policies in the nation, and it was also among the first states to adopt liberal policies on cultural issues such as abortion, gun control, and gay rights.
The overall picture of aggregate stability, however, masks considerable year-to-year fluctuation in policy liberalism as well as major long-term trends in certain states. These details can be discerned more easily in Figure 2 , which plots the yearly time series of individual states 15 . In these years, U.S. states expanded their welfare responsibilities and tax bases while loosening a variety of social restrictions. This aggregate trend towards more liberal policies largely ceased after 1980. Several Midwestern, Mountain, and Southern states have followed the opposite trajectory.
Idaho, for example, became much more conservative over this period. In the 1930s-1950s, Idaho actually had some of the most generous welfare benefits in the nation, but by the early 2000s they were among the least generous. Louisiana too has shifted substantially to the right. In the 1930s, Louisiana's welfare benefits were the most generous in the South and roughly equivalent to those of several Northern states, but they gradually become less generous over the next few decades. Louisiana also waited longer than any other Southern state to pass a durable right-to-work law, but it finally did so in 1976.
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These states' shifts in policy liberalism track the evolution of their presidential partisanship. For instance, in the presidential election of 1936, the first year in our dataset, Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire were the three most Republican states in the nation, but by 2012 all three (especially Vermont) were more Democratic than average. The opposite is true of the Mountain West, which transformed from Democratic-leaning to solidly Republican.
On the whole, the 2010 map in Figure 1 matches contemporaneous state partisanship much 16 . Louisiana passed a right-to-work law in 1954 but repealed it in 1956, when the populist Long faction of the Democratic Party recaptured control of state government (Canak and Miller 1990) . The unusual power of this faction, forged by Governor and Senator Huey Long in the late 1920s, may help explain Louisiana's anomalously (for the region) liberal state policies in that era (Key 1949, 156-82) .
better than the earlier maps, primarily because the South's shift to the Republicans finally aligned its partisanship to match its consistently conservative state policies.
Measurement Validity
Having illustrated the face validity of the policy liberalism estimates, we now conduct a more systematic validation of our measure. We begin with convergent validation (Adcock and Collier 2001), documenting the very strong cross-sectional relationships between our estimates' and existing measures of policy liberalism. We then turn to construct validation, demonstrating that our policy liberalism scale is also highly correlated with measures of theoretically related concepts, such as presidential partisanship. Finally, we show that our policy liberalism scale is strongly related to domain-specific policy measures, and that the predictive fit of the model barely increases if a second dimension is added to the measurement model. Overall, this evidence corroborates our claim that a one-dimensional model adequately captures the systematic variation in state policies, and that this dimension is properly interpreted as policy liberalism.
Convergent Validation
If our estimates provide a valid measure of policy liberalism, they should be strongly related to other (valid) measures of the same concept. Since ours is the first time-varying measure of state policy liberalism, we must content ourselves with examining the cross-sectional relationship between our measure and ones developed by other scholars at various points in time. Figure 3 plots the cross-sectional relationships between our measure of policy liberalism and six existing measures:
• "liberalness"/"welfare orientation" rank circa 1957 (Ho↵erbert 1966) 
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• welfare-education liberalism in 1962 (Sharkansky and Ho↵erbert 1969) 18 17. This index is based on mean per-recipient expenditures for 1952-61 for aid to the blind, old age assistance, unemployment compensation, expenditure for elementary and secondary education, and aid to dependent children. We compare Ho↵erbert's (1966) scale with our measure of state policy liberalism in 1957 since this is the midpoint of the years he includes in his index.
18. This index is based on about twenty education and welfare policies. Note, however, that this index 20. This measure is based on state education spending, the scope of state Medicaid programs, consumer protection laws, criminal justice provisions, whether states allowed legalized gambling, the number of years since ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment for Women, and the progressivity of state tax systems. We compare Wright, Erikson, and McIver's (1987) scale with our measure of state policy liberalism in 1980 since this is roughly the midpoint of the years they include in their index.
21. This index is based on state firearms laws, state abortion laws, welfare stringency, state right-to-work laws, and the progressively of state tax systems. In short, the very strong empirical relationships between our policy liberalism scale and existing measures of the same concept provide compelling evidence for the validity of our measure. It is worth noting that most of the existing scales were constructed explicitly with the goal of di↵erentiating between liberal and conservative states. Thus their tight relationship with our measure, which is based on a much more comprehensive policy dataset and was estimated without regard to the ideological content of the policy indicators, 23 suggests in particular that we are on firm ground in calling our latent dimension "policy liberalism."
Construct Validation
The purpose of construct (a.k.a. "nomological") validation is to demonstrate that a measure conforms to well-established hypotheses relating the concept being measured to other concepts (Adcock and Collier 2001, 542-3) . One such hypothesis is that the liberalism of a state's policies is strongly related to the liberalism of its state legislature, though due to 22 . This is the first principal component uncovered by Sorens, Muedini, and Ruger's (2008) analysis of over 100 state policies. They label this dimension "policy liberalism" and give the label "policy urbanism" to the second principal component.
23. This is true except for the hard coding required to identify the latent scale.
factors such as legislative gridlock the relationship may not be perfect (e.g., Krehbiel 1998).
To measure legislative liberalism on a common scale, we rely on Shor and McCarty's (2011) estimates of the conservatism of members of state legislative lower houses. As Figure 4 demonstrates The analysis of presidential vote thus provides further evidence for the validity of our policy liberalism scale. At same time, however, it suggests the limitations of presidential vote share as a proxy for mass preferences before the 1960s, even in the non-South (contra, e.g.,
Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002).
Finally, we examine the relationship between our policy liberalism measure and its closest analogue, Jacoby and Schneider's (2009) policy priorities scale. As we emphasize above, policy liberalism and policy priorities are di↵erent concepts. Moreover, the theoretical relationship between policy liberalism and preference for collective over particularistic spending is not self-evident. Nevertheless, Jacoby and Schneider convincingly argue that in U.S. states tend to target particularized policies at needy constituencies. Consistent with that expectation, they find a moderately negative cross-sectional correlation between policy liberalism and preference for collective goods.
Based on a similar analysis, we too find policy liberalism and policy priorities to be negatively correlated, on the order of 0.5. As Figure 6 shows, their relationship atten- we find that non-linearity in the measures' relationship contributes to the weak correlation:
their association is much stronger among relatively liberal and particularistic states than on the conservative/collective-good end of the spectrum. This seems to be driven in part by Southern states, which always anchor the conservative end of our scale but seem to favor par- 
Dimensionality
Our one-dimensional model of state policies implies that a single latent trait captures systematic policy variation across states. This is not to say that it captures all policy di↵erences, but it does imply that once policies' characteristics and states' policy liberalism are accounted for, any additional variation in state policies is essentially random. This assumption would be violated if there were instead multiple dimensions of state policy, as some schol-ars have claimed. Given that roll-call alignments in the U.S. Congress were substantially two-dimensional for much of the 20th century (Poole and Rosenthal 2007) , it is not unreasonable to suspect that state policies might be as well. As we demonstrate, however, a one-dimensional model captures state policy variation surprisingly well, and there is little value to increasing the complexity of the model by adding further dimensions. Relationships between policy liberalism and four issue-specific scales (abortion rights, environmental protection, gay rights, and welfare benefits).
One fact in support for unidimensionality is that the most discriminating policies in our dataset-those most strongly related to the latent factor-span a wide range of issues, including racial discrimination, women's rights, gun control, labor law, energy policy, criminal Figure 7 shows, policy liberalism accurately predicts variation within each of these disparate policy areas.
We can explore this question at a higher level of generality by scaling state policies within each of three broad issue domains: economic, social, and racial. Table 1 shows, however, each domain-specific scale is strongly related to the policy liberalism scale based on all policies. The domain-specific scales are also highly correlated with each other, with the correlation being weakest for racial and social policies (estimated for 1950-70 only). On the whole, Table 1 provides strong evidence that variation in state policies is one-dimensional and does not vary importantly across issue domains.
As a final piece of evidence, we show that allowing for multiple latent dimensions does not 24. Because cross-state variation in civil rights policies is concentrated in the 1950-70 period, we estimate the racial policy dimension for these two decades only. substantially improve our ability to predict policy di↵erences between states. As our measure of model fit we use percentage correctly predicted (PCP), which for binary variables is the percentage of cases for which the observed value corresponds to its model-based predicted value (0 or 1). In order to include ordinal and continuous variables in this calculation, we convert them into binary variables by dichotomizing them at a threshold randomly generated for each variable. We estimate one and two-dimensional probit IRT models separately in each year using the R function ideal (Jackman 2012), which automatically calculates PCP. We then evaluate how much the second dimension improves PCP (adding dimensions cannot decrease PCP).
Based on this method, we find little evidence that adding dimensions improves our ability to account for the data. In the average year, a one-dimensional model correctly classifies 82% of all dichotomized policy observations. Adding a second dimension increases average PCP by only 1.5 percentage points. This improvement in model fit is less than the increase in fit that is used in the congressional literature as a barometer of whether roll-call voting in Congress has a one-dimensional structure (Poole and Rosenthal 2007, 33-4) . Further, the minimal improvement in model fit gained from adding a second dimension is consistent across time-even during the mid-century heyday of two-dimensional voting in Congress.
Taken as a whole, the evidence supports two conclusions. First, a single latent dimension captures the vast majority of policy variation across states across disparate policy domains. This is true even at times when national politics was multidimensional. Second, the approximately 20% of cross-sectional policy variation not captured by a one-dimensional model does not seem to have a systematic structure to it, or at least not one that can be described by additional dimensions.
Substantive Applications
Our dynamic measure of policy liberalism opens up multiple avenues of research not possible with cross-sectional measures. Most obviously, as we have shown, it permits descriptive analyses of the ideological evolution of state policies over long periods of time. But the availability of a dynamic measure also facilitates causal analyses that incorporate policy liberalism as an outcome, treatment, or control variable. In particular, because it is available for each state-year, our measure can be used in time-series-cross-sectional (TSCS) research designs, which leverage variation across both units and time. The fact that our estimates are available for nearly 80 years is especially valuable because TSCS estimators can perform poorly unless the number of time units is large (e.g., Nickell 1981).
For example, scholars could examine how the cross-sectional relationship between state public opinion and policy liberalism has evolved over time (Burstein 2003 
The Policy E↵ects of Voter Registration Reforms
To illustrate the kinds of analyses made possible by our estimates, we conduct a brief investigation into the policy e↵ects of reforms designed to make voter registration easier. While debate over such reforms often focuses on e↵ects on turnout or partisan advantage, their ef-fects on policy are arguably most important. 25 One intuitive theoretical prediction, derived from median-voter models of redistribution, is that lowering registration barriers makes the electorate larger and poorer, which in turn increases political support for redistributive (i.e., liberal) policies (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Husted and Kenny 1997).
The policy consequences of registration regulations specifically have been examined by Besley and Case (2003, 35-7) , who using a fixed-e↵ect (FE) framework find liberalizing e↵ects of lower registration barriers on five state taxation and spending policies in the period 1958-98. Besley and Case's two-way FE specification improves substantially over crosssectional comparisons, which cannot control for unobserved di↵erences between states. An important weakness of their specification, however, is that it assumes that states did not trend in di↵erent directions over the period they examine.
26 Figure 2 suggests, however, that this assumption is false (see, e.g., the liberalizing trend among Northeastern states).
The likely consequence is that Besley and Case's e↵ect estimates are much too large.
We replicate and extend Besley and Case's analysis, examining the policy e↵ects of three electoral policies-"motor voter" laws, election-day registration, and mail-in registration-on state policy liberalism between 1950 and 2000. 27 To guard against di↵erential time trends, we use a more conservative specification that includes a lagged dependent variable (LDV)
as well as state and year FEs. 28 One advantage of a long time series is the finite-sample bias of LDV-FE models is of order 1 /T and thus decreases rapidly as the number of time units increases (Beck and Katz 2011, 342). Table 2 reports the estimated e↵ect estimates, all of which are positive and, except for motor voter registration, distinguishable from 0.
In terms of substantive magnitude, these estimates imply that making voter registration easier increases the probability of a state adopting a liberal law by about 1 percentage point. 27. We obtained data on the first two policies from Besley and Case (2003) and data on the third from Springer (2014).
28. Following Besley and Case (2003), we define a unit-year as "treated" by a registration policy if that policy was in e↵ect at the last election.
Consistent with our concern about state-specific trends, the estimates from a simple two-way FE model (not shown) are all an order of magnitude larger than their LDV-FE counterparts. Though brief, this application highlights several advantages of our measure of policy liberalism. First, its TSCS structure enables us to exploit within-state variation in institutions such as registration regulation. Second, its long time series permits the use of estimators, such as LDV-FE models, whose performance improves as T increases. Third, the precision of our composite measure relative to any individual indicator of liberalism means allows us to detect small but meaningful e↵ects, such as the ones reported in Table 2 .
Conclusion
This 
